

## Community resources

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*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 09STATE50260,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09STATE50260**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09STATE50260	2009-05-15 22:06	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988328.ece>

VZCZCXYZ0009  
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0260 1352219  
ZNY SSSS ZZH  
P 152206Z MAY 09  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0000  
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 050260

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2034 TAGS: [PARM](#) [MTCRE](#) [PREL](#) [IR](#) [TU](#) [KS](#)

REF: A. STATE 028283 B. SEOUL 000504 C. SEOUL 000677

Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham; REASONS 1.4 (B), (C) AND (D).

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Seoul, please see paragraph 5.

[1](#)2. (S) Background/Purpose/Objective: In March 2009, the United States advised the ROK that Turkey-based intermediary Ak Makina was working to

[1](#)3. (S) In April 2009, South Korea responded that it was unable to corroborate the U.S. information and that its investigation did not find any

[1](#)4. (S) We want to follow-up with the ROKG on this case to stress that this transaction involved an Iranian firm acting as a false end-user in

[1](#)5. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Seoul approach appropriate host government authorities to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph

[1](#)6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET REL SOUTH KOREA)

-- In March 2009, the United States advised your government that the Turkey-based intermediary Ak Makina was working to supply Irans Ardalan Ma  
-- We brought this information to your attention because

Ardalan Machinerics is associated with Irans liquid propellant ballistic missile developer Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG).

-- We believe Ardalan Machinerics is acting as a false end-user in its dealings with Ak Makina to circumvent export controls restrictions in bc

-- Recently, you informed us that your investigation of this activity did not uncover any evidence confirming our information or find any irreg

-- You noted that the sale raised by the United States occurred in December 2008 and that the South Korean exporter, Hyundai-Kia, has maintaine

-- You also indicated that Hyundai-Kia did not apply for an export license in this case because the machine tools were not controlled under any

-- In addition, you stated that neither Hyundai-Kia nor Ak Makina is on a "watch list" and, because Ak Makina is located in Turkey, a member of

-- Finally, your response indicated that your government can only intervene to prevent such an export in one of the following circumstances:

- the purchaser is subject to a denial by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG);

- the item being exported is controlled;

- the seller or buyer has made false declarations to obtain an export license; or

- the purchasing firm is located in a country that is not a member of any of the multilateral export control regimes.

-- We appreciate your efforts to investigate this transaction and your determining that the export raised by the United States has already occu

-- However, we also believe this transaction raises clear missile proliferation concerns and that there is sufficient justification for your gc

-- In particular, we note that this transaction involved the Iranian firm Ardalan Machinerics, which was acting as an end-user in order to acqu

-- As you are aware from numerous MTCR Information Exchange presentations, Irans missile program routinely uses front companies and false end-u

-- This is exactly the role Ardalan Machinerics was playing in this transaction.

-- In addition, as the lead agency for Irans liquid propellant ballistic missile program, SHIG is an entity of significant proliferation concer

-- SHIG also is an entity designated under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737.

-- Given that Ardalan Machinerics was procuring these machine tools for SHIG, we believe they were likely intended to support Irans ballistic m

-- The use of your catch-all controls in such a case would be consistent with the MTCR Partners 2009 agreement to consider potential missile-re

-- Because Irans SHIG was the ultimate end-user in this transaction and used a false intermediary to acquire South Korean-origin machine tools,

-- Recognizing that this particular transfer has already taken place, we ask that you closely monitor any future dealings between South Korean

-- Such action should include the use of pre-license checks to verify the bona fides of an end-user and post-shipment verifications to confirm

-- We believe such actions would be consistent with UNSCR 1737 and our shared missile nonproliferation goals.

-- We look forward to future cooperation on nonproliferation issues and to hearing of any measures you plan to take in response to this inform